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This paper investigates the contribution of fundamentals to the persistence of currency crises 
by identifying the determinants of high volatility in the exchange market pressure index 
(empi) for some new EU member states.  The Markov switching model is utilised to identify 
the high volatility of empi, and a linear regression analysis is conducted to find the sources of 
the transition probability of the high volatility regime.  The evidence does not seem to provide 
strong support for macroeconomic fundamentals, whereas it highlights the adverse movement 
of interest rates as the major determinant of the persistence of the currency crisis.     
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1. Introduction 
 
An index of speculative pressure known as the exchange market pressure index (empi) was 
advocated by Eichengreen et al. (1996), where currency crisis episodes are identified by the 
changes in the three components of nominal exchange rates, international reserves and interest 
rates1.  A substantial body of empirical literature has followed by constructing an ‘early 
warning system’ to predict a currency crisis based on empi (e.g. Kaminsky et al. 1998, Berg et 
al. 2000, Cerra and Saxena 2002, Edison 2003 and Kamin et al. 2007).  In all, identifying 
leading indicators for currency crisis episodes plays a crucial role in these empirical studies 
with indicators such as fundamentals, financial variables or fiscal indicators by setting a 
threshold.  Some studies have stressed the contagion effect of financial crises, as observed 
from many crises of the 1990s (e.g. Glick and Rose 1999,  Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000, and 
Fratzscher 2003).   
 In this paper, departing from the earlier literature, we investigate the driving forces 
behind the high volatility in empi by utilising the Markov switching model for the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia over the sample period 1994 to 2006 by 
using the monthly data2.  The purpose of this paper is not to predict the early warning for 
currency crisis, but to establish the relative importance of different forces driving the 
increasing volatility of empi.  Note that Mody and Taylor (2007) investigated the 
determinants of empi by taking account of common regional factors for the Asian financial 
crisis region, but their work is limited to be the level of empi.   
 The methodology applied in this paper is based on two stages. In the first stage, the 
two-state Markov switching model is utilised to identify low and high volatility regimes of 
empi. After the pioneering work of Hamilton (1989), the Markov switching models have been 
used extensively in modelling non-linear financial time series due to their greater power to 
distinguish different levels of volatility3.  In recent years, it has also been applied to the 
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currency crisis analysis, see, for example, Jeanne and Masson (2000), Cerra and Saxena 
(2002), Soledad and Peria (2002), Fratzscher (2003) and Abiad (2003).  The advantage of the 
use of the Markov model is the ability to detect the turning points between tranquil and 
speculative attack periods that are indicated by low and high regimes of volatility in empi, 
respectively. It is argued that a discrete measure of crises in probit models, which are 
frequently employed for the analysis of currency crises, leads to a loss of information on the 
scale of speculative pressure, as it excludes incidents below the arbitrary threshold value.  
This is a cause of sample bias, since the selection of only high values of empi as the 
dependent variable in the probit models may reduce the anticipated crises, which may arise 
from fluctuations at the lower level (Flood and Marion 1998).  With Markov switching 
models (MSM), although the regime shift is not directly observable, probabilistic inferences 
can be drawn from the behaviour of observable series with no need for a priori dating of crisis 
episodes. This means that the identification and characterization of crisis periods are part of 
the models’ output, which can be estimated simultaneously with the crisis forecast 
probabilities in a maximum likelihood framework. Such methodology could, therefore, avoid 
the pitfalls associated with the previous dating procedure4. 
 In the second stage, a linear regression analysis is conducted with the probability 
values of the high volatility or high pressure period derived from MSM as a dependent 
variable.  The dependent variable is regressed linearly upon a set of economic and financial 
indicators, in order to explore the potential determinants that govern the high pressure period, 
or sustain the crisis period.   It is argued that currency crises are usually preceded by a broad 
range of economic problems, for example, Kaminsky et al. (1998) identified various 
indicators as signalling devices to a currency crisis.  Hence, a wider set of variables are 
considered including the macroeconomic fundamentals and the determinants relating to the 
characteristics of financial sector soundness.   
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 Note that the time-varying transition probability (TVTP) of the Markov model is, 
perhaps, more robust, since the indicators can enter both the level of empi and the transition 
probabilities simultaneously, thereby there is no loss of information. However, such a model 
strategy may be impractical in the current study.  With a large set of indicator variables 
specified, the major limitation is the difficulty in detecting the significant coefficients and also 
in obtaining convergence.  For example, Cerra and Saxena (2002) analyse Indonesia’s 
currency crisis by applying the TVTP model. Although, a relatively large set of variables are 
considered in Cerra and Saxena’s study, in fact, the variables entered into TVTP include only 
empi for Thailand and Korea, in order to test the contagion effect from the neighbouring 
countries.  Abiad (2003) also used TVTP for the Asian crisis episode during the period 1972-
1999, but found it difficult to obtain significant coefficients on fundamentals5.  Peria (2002) 
investigates the speculative attacks on the European Monetary System using the pooled data 
for seven monetary union member states  over the sample period 1979-1993, with the 
transition probability being a logistic function of the six fundamental variables.  In Peria 
(2002), most of the fundamentals fail to reach a standard significance level.   
There are a number of reasons to apply this study to these transition economies.  
Firstly, since the transition process from command to market economies took place in the 
early 1990s, these economies have experienced varying exchange rate systems.  In the earlier 
transition period, a fixed regime was common, and as the transition process progressed, 
managed flexible exchange rates or a widening of the bands were frequently introduced.  
Meanwhile, economic structural reforms were undertaken including a massive privatisation 
and market opening policy.  With the unsettling of exchange rate systems and sizable 
structural changes to the economy, these economies have continued to be exposed to 
vulnerability to external shocks.  Secondly, it is noted that currency crises tend to coexist with 
banking crises (Kaminsky and Reinhard 1996).  This is particularly relevant for the transition 
economies with the frailty of their banking sectors.  At the start of the transition period, 
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independent commercial banks were created from a former monobank system, and the newly 
established banks had, in effect, little capability for appraising projects.  Consequently, the 
banking sector was prone to the accumulation of non-performing loans (NPL) leading to 
banking crises6.   Moreover, in emerging economies, government and firms tend to rely on 
foreign currency denominated debt, hence exchange rate changes can have a significant 
impact on debtors’ balance sheets or the profitability of banks (Amato and Gerlach 2002).  
Hence, stable exchange rates are one of the major factors which prevent banking crises.  
Given the current banking crisis, the study has never been more timely.  Thirdly, it is 
associated with joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) for these new member 
countries.  Joining the euro was subject to the participation in the ERM II as a pre-requisite 
under the Maastricht criteria, and the stability of foreign exchange markets is deemed to be a 
necessary condition.  Slovenia joined ERM II in 2004 moving away from a managed floating 
system, and adopted the euro in 2007.  The inclusion of Slovenia would provide a useful 
insight into joining the single currency for the new non-euro EU countries.  With these 
considerations, it is hoped that this study is contributory to policy makers by delivering policy 
options concerning a course of actions to stabilise their foreign exchange markets and 
safeguard the value of their currency.   
 We find that our empirical results do not seem to provide a strong support for 
macroeconomic fundamentals, whereas it highlights the adverse movement of interest rates as 
the major determinant of the persistence of a currency crisis.      
This paper is organised in the following manner.  Section 2 specifies the index of 
exchange market pressure and the two states Markov-switching model with fixed transition 
probabilities.  In Section 3, the potential determinants of high volatility in exchange market 
pressure are described, and also the data for estimation are spelled out.  In Section 4 
estimation results are presented.  Section 5 concludes. 
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2  Exchange market pressure index and Markov switching model  
 
The exchange market pressure index (empi) for a country i at time t can be constructed as: 
it
it
it
it
it
it ir
r
e
eempi Δ+Δ−Δ= γβα        (1) 
where ite , itr  and iti  denote, respectively, the nominal exchange rate (domestic price of 
foreign currency), level of foreign exchange reserves and short-term interest rates.   Δ denotes 
the first-difference operator.  The weights α, β and γ are chosen such that each of the three 
components on the right-hand side of equation (1) has a standard deviation of unity, which is 
to preclude any one of them from dominating the index.  Note that changes in exchange rates 
and interest rates enter with a positive weight and changes in reserves have a negative weight, 
so that deprecation of exchange rates, a sharp increase in interest rates, and a decline in 
reserves raise the index of exchange market pressure. 
An intense increase in speculative pressure on a currency is an indication of currency 
crisis, and a high empi implies the high pressure imposed on the currency.  Equation (1) 
suggests that if there is an attack on the currency, the exchange rate would depreciate, interest 
rates are raised, or foreign reserves are withdrawn due to the central banks’ intervention to 
prevent the attack.     
We model the currency crisis by assuming that the market pressure indicator 
computed in equation (1) follows a Markov process with a fixed transition probability. 
Suppose a discrete random variable tS  takes on two possible values [ ( )1 ,0=tS ], where the 
value 0=tS  indicates a period of low pressure for devaluation, and 1=tS  denotes a period 
of high devaluation pressure7.  empi , which is  conditional on the value of tS  is given by  
( ) ttttt SSSempi εσαα )(1 10 ++−=        (2) 
where  εt  is an i.i.d N(0, 1) variable. tS  is an unobserved indicator variable that evolves 
according to a first-order Markov-switching process as in Hamilton (1989), 
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[ ] 01 00 pSSP tt === −  
[ ] 11 11 pSSP tt === −  
10 0 << p , 10 1 << p         
where  and  are fixed transition probabilities of being in tranquil and high pressure 
(crisis)  periods, respectively. Since tS  is unobservable, the unknown parameters of the model 
can be estimated using the non-linear filter proposed by Hamilton (1989). Further, with  
Hamilton's algorithm we can obtain the filtered probabilities, i.e. the probabilities of being in 
state S, which is conditional upon the information available at time t, 
( )1,,PrPr empiempiSS ttt …==        (3) 
These provide information about the state, in which tempi  is most likely to be at every point 
of the observations in the sample.   
 
3. Determinants of high volatility in exchange market pressure and data for estimation 
 
In Kaminsky et.al (1998) and Edison (2003), vulnerability to crisis is signalled when 
‘indicator variables’ deviate from their behaviour during non-crisis periods.  We take such 
indicator variables as the driving force to a high volatility regime in empi in this paper.  The 
indicator variables are chosen based on the following theoretical aspects.   
It is argued that crises were caused by economic fundamentals, such as excessive 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, leading to a substantial loss of foreign reserves 
under a fixed exchange rate regime (Krugman 1979).  Similarly, domestic credit expansion 
above the growth  rate of money demand is likely to deplete international reserves.  With the 
loss of reserves, yet under the circumstances where the authorities adhere to an exchange rate 
parity, domestic interest rates have to increase and stay to be at a high level.  The adverse 
consequence is a fall in the level of output and employment due to a higher level of borrowing 
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costs.  The detrimental effect of expansionary policy may also be translated into the trade 
balance and exchange rates.  An increase in demand for traded goods worsens the terms of 
trade, whereas a higher demand for non-traded goods increases the relative prices of these 
goods and we may observe a real appreciation of exchange rates.  It is known that a real 
appreciation and deterioration of the trade balance are shown to be prone to speculative 
attacks.     
Under the fixed rate system, domestic interest rates move in line with foreign interest 
rates, though to a lesser degree in the case of a crawling peg system.  When domestic interest 
rates are raised more than an increase in foreign interest rates, for example, due to the 
depletion of foreign reserves, such a situation is a cause of high volatility.  However, on the 
other hand, if foreign interest rates exceed a tolerable level, the cost of maintaining the 
exchange rate may outweigh the benefits, since the high domestic interest rates dampen both 
investment and output.  In these circumstances, a volatile state may also be inevitable.  
Interest rates are therefore compelling candidates as determinants of high volatility.   
 The banking crises can be reflected in such indicators as stock prices in the banking 
sector, the proportion of non-performing assets, the level of central banks’ credit to banks, a 
decline in deposits and the spread between lending and deposit rates.     
[Table 1 around here] 
With the above considerations, and also with data availability on a monthly basis, we 
explore a broad range of 18 dependent variables as the determinants of high volatility in empi  
for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia over the sample period 
1994:01 to 2006:12.  The variables can be classified into five groups of current account 
indicators, capital account indicators, real sector indicators, financial indicators and also 
external indicators8.  Data are listed in Table 1 with the abbreviation of each variable and the 
predicted signs in brackets.  The (+) implies that an increase in variables is associated with a 
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high volatility, whilst the (-) indicates that a decrease is related to the high volatility period.  
Data sources are found in Appendix.   
  
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Markov switching model  
 
[Table 2 and Figure 1 around here] 
Table 2 shows the estimates from MSM for the five countries.  The Davies (1987) upper 
bound test is adopted for the null of linearity9.  The results show that the linearity of empi can 
be rejected for all cases, confirming the nonlinearity.  The volatility, indicated by the 
estimates of σ in both states are statistically highly significant at above 1 percent level, and the 
magnitude of the coefficient in regime 1 is much larger than that in regime 0, ranging from 
2.05  times in Poland to 13.22 times in Slovakia.  These results provide the crucial statistical 
evidence that there exist two volatility regimes of tranquil and crisis periods in the series of 
empi, though the two-state means are not so significant.  State 0 can be identified as a low-
mean, low-volatility regime, whereas state 1 is a high-mean, high-volatility regime.    
In Figure 1, the level of empi specified in equation (1) is plotted at the top of each 
graph with the scale on the right hand side, together with the probability of the high volatility 
regime of empi derived from MSM at the bottom with the scale on the left hand side for 
comparison.  The charts show that large fluctuations in empi appear to correspond well with 
the high probability of the volatile regime.  Hence, when a country is under a higher pressure 
of depreciation with a large positive value of empi, the foreign exchange market is likely to be 
in a high volatility regime.   
Each country seems to have experienced a different degree of stress at a different 
period, yet, there are some common features apparent in Figure 1.  During the early period in 
1994-1995, almost all of the countries demonstrated a high volatility, suggesting that their 
currencies were under pressure of a speculative attack. The transition process from the 
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planned to market economies in the early sample period may have exerted a high tension in 
the foreign exchange markets.   During the Asian and Russian crises in 1997-98, volatile 
markets are also evident, yet it is not certain whether this is solely due to contingent effects, 
since at the same time these countries had their own currency crisis and/or the changes in the 
exchange rate systems (as described in the subsequent paragraph below).  It is noticeable that 
a short-lived high volatility is exhibited in 2002 for the Czech republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia, implying that entering the EU may have caused some degree of concern about 
speculative attack.  
The introduction of a managed or full floating exchange rate regime broadly 
corresponds with a high volatility regime of empi, especially for the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, who adopted the floating system following the currency crisis of 1997 and 1998 
respectively10.  At the time of the currency crisis, empi peaked with almost 100% probability 
of staying in a high volatility regime11.  The only exception is for Hungary, where it had a low 
volatility when a floating system was adopted in 2001.  However, when Hungary and also 
Poland widened the band to as large as circa 15% in 1998, high volatility is evident.   
Slovenia opted for ERM II in 2004 from the managed floating system, and joined the 
euro in January 2007.  It is apparent that the low probability of high volatility is sustained for 
Slovenia from around 2000 onward leading to its joining the monetary union in 2004.     
 
4.2     Linear regression results  
[Table 3 around here] 
A regression analysis is conducted, as shown in Table 3 with the transition probability of the 
high volatility regime derived from MSM as the dependent variable. This investigates the 
variables governing the persistence of the crisis.  We take lagged-once regressors with the 
assumption that the transition probability at t is formed based on information contained in 
indicators at t-112.  The variables marked with * have statistically significant coefficients at 
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the 10% or higher level with the correct sign.  In general, Hungary has a relatively better 
empirical performance with more significant coefficients.     
Whilst a number of common findings are observed amongst these countries, the 
performance of each indicator widely varies from country to country.  In this respect, the 
assumption of parameter equality across countries based on a panel of countries in the 
currency crisis literature (Peria 2000 and Fiess and Shanker 2009) may result in poor 
predictive performance.  The results bear a number of determinants which should merit more 
scrutiny for individual countries.  For example, deviations of the real exchange rate from the 
trend (reex_w) should be monitored in Hungary and Slovenia.  The foreign exchange reserves 
(fr) may be critical indicators to the persistence of a volatile foreign exchange market in 
Poland and Slovakia.  Expansionary monetary policy, exceeding the growth rate of foreign 
reserves (m2/fr), is likely to be the cause of the high volatility regime in Slovakia.  The 
contraction of the economy (ip) and the stock market (stock) seem to be responsible for the 
instability in the Czech Republic.  A growth in domestic credit is also a concern in Hungary.    
One of the common findings is that a high volatility regime appears to be driven by 
variables that are related to the adverse movement of interest rates, i.e. lr/dr, rdr and rid_w.   
In each country, at least one of the coefficients is significant (in the case of Hungary and 
Slovakia, all three coefficients are significant).  The finding of a robust link between interest 
rates and the high volatility regime accords with the literature of currency crises:   For 
example, an increase in domestic interest rates raises financing costs for the government.  
When it is perceived by agents that the government is concerned with the fiscal consequences 
of a higher interest rate due to a high level of public debt, this may be the cause of currency 
crisis with empi being in a high volatility state.  Also, if financial stability is one of the 
objectives set by government, higher interest rates are likely to increase the default rate, 
weakening the banking system.  The authorities may, then, choose to devalue by lowering 
interest rates, when the cost of bailing out the banking system is high (Velasco 1987 and 
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Calvo 1995).  When such a policy action is expected by speculators, high pressure on foreign 
exchange markets may emerge13.    
 Other general findings include the following.  Contrary to expectations, the current 
account balance (import and export) is not much supported as a useful indicator of crises.  
This is not exclusive to our study, since much of the literature also finds little role of the 
current account balance.  It is likely that information embedded in the evolution of imports 
and exports may already have been reflected in the behaviour of real exchange rates 
(Kaminsky et al. 1998)14.  Note, however, that the real overvaluation indicator is only 
significant in Hungary and Slovenia in the current study.  The variables associated with 
international reserves did not fare well in some of these countries, despite the fact that the 
decline in foreign reserves is traditionally supported as the cause of a currency crisis.   
Overall, the real sector and external indicators also have little predictive power during the 
currency crises.  We leave the discussion of the insignificant effect of these key 
macroeconomic variables to the conclusion. 
   
5. Conclusion 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the high volatility 
regime in exchange market pressure that is associated with a currency crisis in some new EU 
member states.  The model developed in this paper allows the transition probability of high 
volatility periods to be a function of various determinants.  We assumed that macroeconomic 
fundamentals and financial variables affect the probability of regime transition. 
 The overall result suggests that variables related to interest rates have been shown to 
be contributions to the persistence of high volatility regimes in all cases, whereas  the 
empirical evidence points less to balance of payment indicators and real sector variables as 
determinants.  The latter is contrasted with the study on the warning system, where a broad 
variety of indicators is found, and currency crises seem to be preceded by multiple economic 
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variables15.  In this respect, in terms of the predictability, macroeconomic fundamentals may 
indeed be useful indicators for triggering a currency crisis, yet they may no longer be the 
robust determinants during the crises period.   
The weak effect of the macroeconomic fundamentals appears to support the self-
fulfilling nature of speculative attacks, for example, Obstfeld (1996) showed that currency 
crises can happen even when the level of foreign reserves is sound.  Obstfeld (1994) 
emphasizes endogenous economic policies and agents’ expectations16:  Policymakers respond 
to changes in the economy, and agents’ expectations are formed based on such a relationship, 
and these expectations, in turn, affect some variables to which policymakers again react.  
Henceforth, this circularity gives rise to self-fulfilling crises, and is said to generate multiple 
equilibria, where the economy moves from one equilibrium to another without a significant 
change in the fundamentals, but with changes to agents’ expectations (Kaminsky et al. 1998).  
An implication of self-fulfilling crises is that these limit the investigation of attempts to find a 
defined relationship between fundamentals and crises, since a crisis may be persistent without 
a prior significant change in fundamentals.  Although it is not clear that such expectations are 
subsumed in the movement of interest rates in this paper, the significant effect of interest rate 
differentials or real deposit rates on the high volatility in empi may serve to prove that this 
may be the case.     
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Appendix     Data sources (1994:01 to 2006:12) 
  
Variables Source 
Deposits IFS line 24 (demand deposits) and 25 (time deposits)  
Deposit rates IFS line 60L, except for German and USA deposit 
rates which are retrieved from Datastream 
Lending rates IFS line 60P  
CPI (inflation) IFS line 64, except for the euro area CPI, which is 
retrieved from OECD Main Economic Indicator 
Export IFS line 70 
Import IFS line 71 
Foreign exchange reserves IFS line 1D 
Domestic credit1 IFS line 32 
Industrial production IFS line 66 
M2 (money and quasi money) IFS line 35L 
M1 (money) IFS line 34 
M0 Datastream Base money  
Stock prices IFS line 62 
Exchange rates US$  IFS line RF, a number of domestic currency per US$ 
Exchange rates ECU/Euro Datastream, a number of domestic currency per Euro 
Short term interest rates Datastream 
Foreign liabilities IFS line 16C 
Base money Datastream M0 
GDP in US and Germany IFS line 66 industrial production 
Oil price Datastream Crude oil  
1 To the extent that excessive credit to the public sector and also excessive central bank credit to banking sector 
may play the same role in currency crises, we use the data of  ‘domestic credit’, which include claims on central 
government, private sector and financial institutions.
15 
 
Reference 
 
Abiad, A. (2003).  Early-warning systems: a survey and a regime-switching approach, IMF 
Working paper WP/03/32. 
 
Amato, J.D. and S. Gerlach. (2002).  Inflation targeting in emerging market and transition    
economies: Lessons after a decade, European Economic Review, 46, 781-790.  
 
Bai, J., 1996, ‘Estimation of a change point in multiple regression model’, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 79, 551-563. 
 
Berg A, Borensztein E, Milesi-Ferreti GM, Pattillo C. 2000. Anticipating balance of payment 
crises: The role of early warning systems, IMF Occasion Paper 186. 
 
Bonin, J.P. and Schaffer, M.E. 2002.  Revisiting Hungary’s bankruptcy episode. In: 
Meyendorff, A, Thakor, A. (Eds.), Designing financial systems in transition economies: 
Strategies for reform in Central and Eastern Europe, 59-99. 
 
Calvo, G. A (1995).  Varieties of capital market crises, Centre for International Economics 
Working Paper No. 15 (College Park, Maryland: University of Maryland, November) 
 
Calvo, S and C.M. Reinhard, 1996, Capital flows to latin America: Is there evidence of 
contagion effects? In Private capital flows to emerging markets after the Mexican crisis, 
ed. By G. A. Calvo, M. Goldstein, and E. Hochreiter (Washington: Institute for 
International Economics) 151-171. 
 
Cerra, V. and Saxena, S.C. 2002, Contagion, monsoons, and domestic turmoil in Indonesia’s 
currency crisis, Review of International Economics, 10:1, 36-44. 
 
Diebold, F., Lee, J.H. and Weinbach, G. (1994).  Regime switching with time-varying 
transition probabilities, in Hargreves, Colin, ed. Nonstationary time series analysis and 
cointegration, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Eddison, H.J. (2003).  Do indicators of financial crises work? An evaluation of an early 
warning system, International Journal of Finance and Economics, 8, 11-53. 
 
Edin, PA and A. Vredin 1993, Devaluation risk in target zones: evidence from the Nordic 
countries, Economic Journal, 103(January), 161-175.  
 
Edison, H. J. 2003. Do indicators of financial crises work? An evaluation of an early warning 
system, International Journal of Finance & Economics, 8, 11-53. 
 
Eichengreen B, Rose AK, Wyplosz C. 1996. Contagious currency crises. Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 98, 463–484. 
 
Eichengreen, B, A.K Rose and C. Wyplosz 1995, Exchange market mayhem: the antecedents 
and aftermath of speculative attacks, Economic Policy, 21(October), 249-312. 
 
Fiess, N. and Shankar, R. (forthcoming), Determinants of exchange rate regime switching, 
Journal of International Money and Finance, forthcoming.     
16 
 
Flood, R. and N. Marion 1998, Perspectives on the recent currency crisis literature, IMF 
working paper WP/98/130. 
 
Frankel, J. and Rose, A. (1996).  Currency crashes in emerging markets: An empirical 
treatment, International Finance Discussion Papaer, No. 534, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, January. 
 
Fratzscher, M. 2003. On currency crises and contagion, International Journal of Finance & 
Economics, 8, 109-129. 
 
Gerlach, S and F Smets 1994, Contagious speculative attacks, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
1055 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, November) 
 
Girton, L. and Roper, D. 1977.  A monetary model of exchange market pressure applied to the 
post-war Canadian experience.  American Economic Review, 67, 537-548. 
 
Glick, R. and Rose, A.K. 1999. Contagion and trade: Why are currency crises regional? 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 18, 603-617. 
 
Goldstein, M. Kaminsky, G. and Reinhart, C. (2000), Assessing financial vulnerability: An 
early warning system for emerging markets, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, D.C.   
 
Hamilton, J. (1990).  Analysis of time series subject to change in regime, Journal of 
Econometrics, 45, 39-70. 
 
Jeanne, O.  and P. Masson (2000), Currency crises, sunspots, and Markov-Switching regimes, 
Journal of international Economics, 50(2), 327-350. 
 
Kamin, S. B, Schindlerz, J. and Samuel, S. 2007. The contribution of domestic and external 
factors to emerging market currency crises: an early warning systems approach, 
International Journal of Finance and Economics, 12: 317-336. 
 
Kaminsky, G. L. and Reinhart, C.M. 2000. On crises, contagion, and confusion 
Journal of International Economics, 51, 145-168. 
 
Kaminsky, G. Lizondo, S. and Reinhard C. (1998).  Leading indicators of currency crises, 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 45, 1-48.  
 
Kaminsky, G.L. and Reinhart, C. (1996)  The twin crises: causes of banking and balance of 
payments crises, American Economic Review, 89(3), 473-500 (June). 
 
Kaminsky, G.L. and Reinhart, C.M. 1999.  The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance 
of payments problems, American Economic Review 89, 473-500. 
 
Kaminsky, G.L. Lizondo, S. and Reinhard, C.M. 1998.  Leading indicators of currency crises, 
International Monetary Fund Staff papers 45, 1-48. 
 
Konings, J., Rizov, M and Vandenbussche, H. 2003.  Investment and financial constraints in 
transition economies: micro evidence from Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and 
Romania, Economics Letters, 78, 253-258. 
17 
 
 
 
Kornai, J 2001.  Hardening the budget constraint: the experience of the post-socialist 
countries, European Economic Review 45, 1095-1136. 
 
Kornai, J. 1992 The Socialist system: The political economy of communism, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
 
Krugman, P. (1979).  A model of balance-of-payments crisis, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 11(August), 311-325. 
 
Lestano, L. and Jacobs, Jan P.A.M. 2007. Dating currency crises with ad hoc and extreme 
value-based thresholds: East Asia 1970-2002.  International Journal of Finance and 
Economics, 12: 371-388. 
 
Lin, C.S., Khan, H.A., Chang, R.Y. and Wang, Y.C. 2008. A new approach to modeling early 
warning systems for currency crises: can a machine-learning fuzzy expert system 
predict the currency crises effectively?  Journal of International Money and Finance, In 
Press. 
 
Lízal, L. and Svejnar, J. 2002.  Investment, credit rationing, and the soft budget constraint: 
evidence from Czech panel data, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 353-370. 
 
Mills, T.C. and Wang,P. 2003 Regime shifts in European real interest rates, 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 139, 66-81 
 
Mody, A. and Taylor, M.P. 2007.  Regional Vulnerability: the case of East Asia, International 
Journal of Money and Finance, 26, 1292-1310. 
 
Moore, T. and Wang, P. 2007.  Volatility in stock returns for new EU member states: Markov 
regime switching model, International Review of Financial Analyses, 16, 282-292. 
 
Obstfeld, M. 1986. Rational and self-fulfilling balance-of-payments crises. American 
Economic Review 76, 72-81. 
 
Obstfeld, M. 1996. Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features. European 
Economic Review 40, 1037-1048. 
 
Ozkan, F. G. And al. Sutherland 1995, Policy measures to avoid a currency crisis, Economic 
Journal, 105(March) 510-519. 
 
Psaradakis, Z., Sola, M. and Spagnolo, F. (2006).  Instrumental-Variables Estimation in 
Markov Switching Models with Endogenous Explanatory Variables: An Application to 
the Term Structure of Interest Rates, Studies of Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics 
10, 1-29.      
 
Radelet, S. and Sachs, J.D. 1998.  The East Asian financial crisis: Diagnosis, remedies, 
prospects, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 1. 
 
Sarno, L. and Taylor, M.P. 1999. Moral hazard, asset price bubbles, capital flows and the East 
Asian crisis: the first tests, Journal of International Money and finance, 18, 637-657.  
18 
 
Peria, S. M. M. (2002), A regime switching approach to studying speculative attacks: a focus 
on EMS crises, Empirical Economics, 27(2), 299-334.   
 
Schaffer, M.E. 1998.  Do firms in transition have soft budget constraints? A reconsideration 
of concepts and evidence, Journal of Comparative Economics 26, 80-103.   
 
Stavárek, D. 2007. Comparative analysis of the exchange market pressure in Central 
European countries with the Eurozone membership perspective. MPRA Paper No. 3906. 
 
Tanner, E. 2001, Exchange market pressure and monetary policy: Asia and Latin America in 
the 1990s, International Monetary Fund Staff papers, 47, 311-333. 
 
Velasoc, A. (1987).  Financial and balance of payments crises: a simple model of the 
Southern cone experience, Journal of Development Economics, 27(October), 263-283. 
 
Wang, P and Moore, T. 2009. Sudden changes in volatility: the case of five central European 
stock markets, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 
forthcoming. 
19 
 
Figure 1  empi (top plot) and probability of high volatility period based on MSM 
(bottom plot)  
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Notes for Figure 1:   
 
The exchange rate systems of the five new EU countries  
Czech Rep. 1995 Bands widened from ±0.5% to ±7.5% 
 1997 May Managed floating  
Hungary 1995 Mar. Crawling peg with a band of ±2.5%  
 1998 Feb. Bands widened to ±15% 
 2001 Oct. Managed floating  
Poland 1995 May Bands widened from ±2.5% to ±7.5% 
 1998 Feb. Bands widened from ±7% to ±10%, to ±12.5% in October 
1998 and to ±15% in 1999 March. 
 2000 April Independent Floating 
Slovakia 1995 Bands widened to ±7% 
 1998 Oct. Managed floating 
Slovenia 1993 to 2004 Managed floating  
 2004 June Joined the ERM II from managed floating 
 2007 Jan Joined the euro  
 
Managed floating
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Table 1  Economic and fundamental indicators with the predicted sign1  
Indicators Notations 
(expected sign) 
Impact on crisis  
Current account indicators 
Deviations of the real exchange 
rate from the trend2 
reex_w (-) A large misalignments (over-valuation or negative 
deviation) of the real exchange rate is linked to instability. 
Imports and exports: imp (+) 
exp (-) 
A deterioration of the trade balance indicates an overvalued 
exchange rate leading to a lower export growth and 
increased import growth.  A weak external sector is linked 
to instability. 
Capital account indicators 
Foreign exchange reserves fr (-) Loss of foreign reserve is associated with instability. 
M2/foreign exchange reserves m2/fr (+)* Expansionary monetary policy with a fall in foreign 
reserves are linked to instability. 
Ratio of foreign liabilities to 
foreign exchange reserves 
fl/fr (+)* This measures foreign exchange exposure risks in the 
financial sector, since large capital inflows fuel a lending 
boom and it proxies the vulnerability of the economy to a 
sudden reversal of capital inflows.  An increase in debt and 
a decline in foreign reserves are likely to cause high 
volatility. 
Real sector indicators 
Industrial production ip (-) Boom (recession) period is linked to a tranquil (high 
volatility) period. 
Stock prices stock (-) Some crises have been preceded by the bursting of an asset 
market bubble, so a sharp fall in asset price is linked to high 
volatility. 
Financial indicators 
Multiplier (ratio of m2 to base 
money) 
m2/bm (+)* The ratio indicates the potential growth of credit. 
Ratio of domestic credit to 
nominal GDP 
dc/ip (+)* A rapid expansion in credit signifies a growing strain in the 
economy, in particular to the banking sector. 
Excess real M1 balances 4  exm1(+)* A loose monetary policy is linked to volatility. 
Commercial bank deposits dep (-) A sharp decline of deposits indicate increased banking 
system fragility with an inadequate level of liquidity to 
respond to shocks. 
Ratio of lending to deposit 
interest rates 
lr/dr (+)* A high lending rate reflects decline in the quality of loans, 
and leads to an increase in non-performing loans and 
default rate. 
Real interest rates on deposits rdr (+)* A high real deposit rate may indicate a liquidity problem.  
In general, increased real interest rates suggest fending off a 
speculative attack. 
The domestic and foreign real 
interest rate differential on 
deposits 3 
rid_w (+)  
or (-) 
The widening of the real interest rate differential may lead 
to high volatility.   
External indicators 
US and German output ip_us (-) 
ip_gm (-) 
A recession in large economies is associated with volatility. 
Oil price oil (+) High oil prices are linked to volatility. 
Note:  
1 The measure of percentage change is used, except for * marked variables, which are checked for stationarity.  
The * marked variables that failed to reject the non-stationary at the 5 percent significant level by the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller are considered as containing a unit root, and therefore are transformed into the first 
difference of the series in the linear regression.  The unit root tests are available from the authors on request.   
2 The trend is based on the Hodrick-Prescott filter.  The variable is a weighted average of US$ and ECU/Euro 
with 35% and 65% respectively.  
3The foreign interest rate is a weighted average of  US (35%) and Germany (65%).   
4 We estimated the demand for real money balance with the explanatory variables of GDP (proxied by industrial 
production), inflation and time trend, and took the difference between the actual and fitted values of the real 
money.   
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Table 2: Estimates from the two-state Markov switching model with the fixed transition 
probabilities 
 Czech Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia 
α1 -0.411    
(-0.580) 
1.180        
(1.424)   
-0.1001   
(-0.331)   
0.603        
(0.557)   
-0.668        
(-1.064)   
α0 -0.431        
(-3.825)      
-0.184    
(-1.276)   
-0.698   
(-4.444)   
-0.350         
(-3.022)   
0.057         
(0.453)   
σ1 12.430         
(3.533)       
11.417         
(2.613)   
4.6279       
(4.468)   
20.373        
(2.066)   
10.555         
(3.719)   
σ0 1.433        
(6.501)     
1.712         
(4.675)   
2.257       
(6.066)   
1.548         
(6.513)   
1.759         
(6.210)  
P1 0.854        
(2.537)     
0.542         
(0.164)   
0.967        
(3.318)   
0.658      
(1.046)   
0.946       
(2.738)   
P0 0.964        
(4.211)     
0.906         
(2.615)   
0.984      
(4.290)   
0.952       
(6.293)   
0.985      
(5.625)   
L’value -292.49 -302.23 -302.11 -294.48 -301.11 
L’value* -318.67 -319.34 -307.27 -326.29 -322.14 
 
LR 
52.36 
[0.000] 
34.22 
[0.000] 
10.32 
[0.065] 
63.62 
[0.000] 
42.06 
[0.000] 
Note: * is the log likelihood value from the one-state model. t-statistics in parentheses. LR is the likelihood ratio 
test of one-state against two-state. The number in the square bracket is the Davies (1987) upper bound p-value.    
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Table 3  Regression analysis with the dependent variable of  
the transition probability in high volatility  period derived from MSM model 
 Czech Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia 
Constant  -1.162 
(-1.298) 
-0.620 * 
(-2.319) 
1.525 * 
(11.525) 
-0.008 
(-0.183) 
0.039 
(1.239) 
Current account indicators 
reex_w 
- 
0.619 
(0.851) 
-1.881* 
(-2.386) 
0.404 
(0.746) 
0.703 
(1.059) 
-4.985 * 
(-5.825) 
imp 
+ 
-0.158 
(-0.489) 
0.380 
(1.487) 
-0.257 
(-0.710) 
-0.230 
(-1.024) 
-0.227 
(-0.929) 
exp 
- 
0.499 
(1.195) 
0.178 
(0.664) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.176 
(0.522) 
0.144 
(0.540) 
Capital account indicators 
fr 
- 
0.382 
(0.659) 
0.569 
(0.693) 
-1.485 * 
(-3.092) 
-0.268 * 
(-1.735) 
-0.325 
(-0.374) 
m2/fr 
+ 
-0.243 
(-1.570) 
0.383 
(0.504) 
-0.752 
(-9.839) 
0.073 * 
(1.821) 
-0.635 
(-0.714) 
fl/fr 
+ 
0.008 
(0.367) 
-0.021 
(-0.315) 
0.106* 
(4.488) 
-0.008 
(-0.203) 
0.004 
(0.227) 
Real sector indicators 
ip 
- 
-2.031 * 
(-1.644) 
2.908  
(2.563) 
-1.572 
(-1.183) 
-1.350 
(-1.588) 
-1.659 
(-1.163) 
stock 
- 
-0.586 * 
(-1.956) 
-0.195 
(-1.143) 
-0.085 
(-0.424) 
-0.300 
(-1.867) 
-0.304 
(-1.201) 
Financial indicators 
m2/bm 
+ 
3.673 * 
(2.682) 
-0.876 
(-2.316) 
-0.003 
(-0.012) 
-0.834 
(-1.083) 
0.004 
(0.014) 
dc/ip 
+ 
-1.632 
(-1.413) 
3.409 * 
(3.129) 
-1.316 
(-1.074) 
-0.558 
(-1.078) 
-0.927 
(-0.783) 
exm1 
+ 
-0.102 
(-0.294) 
1.254 * 
(3.634) 
-0.489 
(-0.839) 
-0.618 
(-1.190) 
0.489 * 
(3.764) 
dep 
- 
-3.966 * 
(-2.220) 
-0.946 
(-0.726) 
1.934 
(1.598) 
0.952 
(1.078) 
1.896 
(1.271) 
lr/dr 
+ 
-0.013 
(-0.047) 
0.518 * 
(2.652) 
0.125 
(0.552) 
0.209 * 
(1.761) 
0.412 * 
(2.309) 
rdr 
+ 
0.018 
(0.240) 
0.073 * 
(2.033) 
0.075 * 
(6.460) 
0.095* 
(3.294) 
0.050 * 
(4.619) 
rid_w 
+  - 
0.069 * 
(5.985) 
0.008 * 
(2.461) 
-0.075* 
(-5.902) 
0.015 * 
(2.932) 
-0.015 
(-1.251) 
External indicators 
ip_gm 
- 
-0.165 
(-0.360) 
0.013 
(0.037) 
-0.100 
(-0.304) 
0.459 
(1.254) 
-0.127 
(-0.258) 
ip_us 
- 
1.327 
(1.033) 
0.749 
(0.937) 
-0.093 
(-0.105) 
1.372 
(1.423) 
0.728 
(0.813) 
oil 
+ 
-0.001 
(-0.003) 
0.504 * 
(2.470) 
0.117 
(0.541) 
0.060 
(0.249) 
0.058 
(0.237) 
      
F-test for 
overall 
significance 
[Prob. Value]  
3.386  
[0.000] 
4.441 
[0.000] 
12.485 
[0.000] 
3.165 
[0.000] 
14.320 
[0.000] 
t-ratios are in bracket.  The predicted sign is attached to each explanatory variable. 
*  The coefficients are significant at least at the level of  10% with the correct sign.    
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Endnotes 
                                                 
 
1 Most of the previous studies exclusively focused on devaluation episodes.  The exchange rate market pressure 
is a broader definition of crisis, which includes not only devaluations, but also episodes of unsuccessful 
speculative attacks.  When a currency is under attack, the central bank can intervene by either an increase in 
domestic interest rates or a substantial loss of foreign reserves to avert the attack (Kaminsky et al. 1998).  
Speculative pressures may not be addressed by merely looking at the data of nominal exchange rates.  
 
2 We concentrate on the five large ‘first’ waves of new EU member states in the Central Eastern Europe region 
due to data availability. 
 
3 For example, Ramchand and Susmel (1998), Hamilton and Susmel (1994), Ang and Bekaert (2002), Morana 
and Beltratti (2002), Billio and Pelizzon (2003) and Moore and Wang (2007) apply the Markove model to the 
volatility of stock returns; Gray (1996) and Garcia and Perron (1996) to interest rates;  Engle and Hamilton 
(1990) and Dewachter (2001) to foreign currencies; others such as Kim and Nelson (1999) to the behaviour of 
business cycles. 
 
4 The value of a threshold is determined, and any value of the index that exceeds the threshold value is classified 
as high pressure.  This is referred to as the dating procedure.   
 
5 Note that in Abiad (2003), the series under investigation is the nominal exchange rates.  Abiad finds that the 
coefficients on the indicators in TVTP model are all correctly signed, but are mostly insignificant.   
 
6 For example, the available data show that a relatively high proportion of NPL at 29.3% of GDP is recorded for 
the Czech Republic in 2000 and 18.6% for Poland in 2001 (World Development Indicator).   
 
7 It is assumed that when empi is in a low (high) volatility regime, the pressure for devaluation is low (high). 
 
8 Contagion effects are commonly found in currency crises (e.g. Gerlach and Smets 1994, Cerra and Sacena 
2002).  For example, devaluation of exchange rates in one country may trigger devaluation in neighbouring 
countries in order to maintain price competitiveness.  Contagion effects may also arise due to investors’ herding 
behaviour, paying little heed to countries’ economic fundamentals (Calvo and Reinhard 1996, and Eichengreen 
et al. 1996).  Political variables may also affect the volatility of empi (see Kaminsky et al 1998 and Cerra and 
Saxena 2002).  In this paper, the effect of exchange market pressure in neighbouring countries is found to be 
insignificant in all cases, and also there is an inadequate data availability for political variables on a monthly 
basis.  We do not pursue these strands.      
 
9 Davies’s (1987) test is based on an adjustment to the Likelihood Ratio test statistic, and  provides an upper 
bound for the correct probability value.  The details of this test are found in Mills and Wang (2003). 
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10 With a worsening trade deficit and an economic slowdown, the Czech koruna reached a ten month low against 
its currency basket in April 1997, and in May 1997, the target band was abandoned and the koruna depreciated 
almost immediately by around 10%.   
 
11 The probability of being in a high volatility regime can, therefore, be interpreted as having a ‘currency crisis’.  
  
12 This is consistent with time varying transition probability model, where a vector of lagged indicators makes 
entry to the Markov model specification.  
 
13 Moreover, the expectation of a collapse, in turn, leads to higher interest rates, which may force the government 
to abandon parity, out of concern for the increased cost of servicing public debt.  This further  increases the 
probability of a banking crisis and the associated fiscal costs of a bailout (Obstfeld 1996). 
 
14 Frankel and Rose (1996) find that the overvaluation of real exchange rates increases the probability of a 
currency crash using panel annual data for 105 countries from 1971 to 1992.  
 
15 For example, Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Goldstein et al. (2000) utilised the signal extraction approach, and 
they find that the overwhelming majority of crises have numerous weak economic fundamentals at their core, 
including a slowdown in economic activity, overvalued exchange rates, reserve loss and a high ratio of broad 
money to international reserves for twenty developed and emerging economies using monthly data from 1970 to 
1997.     
 
16 For example, refer back Footnote 14 in Section 4 in this paper. 
